Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system to disseminate agents' private information to others. Markets populated by human agents are known to be capable of converging to rational expectations equilibria. This paper reports comparable market outcomes when human agents are replaced by boundedly-rational algorithmic agents who use a simple means-end heuristic. These algorithmic agents lack the capability to optimize; yet outcomes of markets populated by them converge near the equilibrium derived from optimization assumptions. These findings point to market structure (rather than cognition or optimization) being an important determinant of efficient aggregate level outcomes. 
Our knowledge of the very narrow limits of human rationality must dispose us to doubt that business firms, investors or consumers possess either the knowledge or computational ability that would be required to carry out the rational expectations strategy.
Herbert Simon (1969) The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of individual irrationalities cannot be made without supporting evidence, and the burden of specifying a plausible corrective mechanism should rest on those who make this claim. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) .
The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. Vernon Smith (2008)

I. INTRODUCTION
A central feature of economic theory is derivation of equilibrium in economies populated by agents who maximize some well-ordered function such as profit or utility. Although it is recognized that actions of economic agents are subject to institutional constraints and feedback (D. North, 1990) , exploration of the extent to which equilibrium arises from characteristics of the institutional environment, as opposed to the behavior of individuals, has been limited; Becker's (1962) derivation of downward slope of demand functions is a notable exception. The normal modeling technique is to ascribe sophisticated computational abilities to a representative agent to solve for equilibrium (J. F. Muth, 1961) . Plott and Sunder (1982, henceforth PS) have shown that markets with uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information (with two or three states of the world) disseminate information and converge near rational expectations equilibria when populated with profit-motivated human traders. The present paper asks if the PS results can also be achieved by minimally intelligent traders (Gode and Sunder 1993) using the means-end heuristic and reports an affirmative answer.
Simon (1969 Chapter 3) questioned the plausibility of human agents, with their limited cognitive abilities, forming rational expectations by intuition.
Accumulated observational evidence on these cognitive limits of individuals shifted the burden of proof, and led to calls for evidence that markets can overcome such behavioral limitations (R. H. Thaler, 1986, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 1986) .
Laboratory studies of markets populated by asymmetrically-informed profit-motivated human subjects reveal that their aggregate level outcomes tend to converge near the predictions of rational expectations theory (R. Forsythe and R. Lundholm, 1990 , R. Forsythe et al., 1982 , C. R. Plott and S. Sunder, 1982 , 1988 .
However, since complex patterns of human behavior can only be inferred, not observed directly, it is difficult to know from human experiments which elements of trader behavior and faculties are necessary or sufficient for various markets to attain their theoretical equilibria 1 . This difficulty has led to claims that inability of human beings to optimize by intuition implies that economic theories based on optimization assumptions are prima facie invalid (for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) Replacing humans by algorithms allows us to examine any causal links between specific characteristics of trader behavior and market outcomes.
Combining Newell and Simon's (1972) means-end heuristic with Gode and Sunder's (1993, 1997) zero-intelligence (ZI) approach, we find and report that markets with uncertainty and asymmetric information attain outcomes approximating rational expectations equilibria, even when they are populated by simple minimally-intelligent adaptive algorithmic traders. Since the statistical distribution of these outcomes is centered near the PS observations of markets with human traders, the convergence of their outcomes to equilibrium can be attributed to the combination of the market structure and the minimal levels of intelligence and adaptive ability built into the trading algorithms. Since these trader faculties are far less demanding than what is assumed in deriving the equilibria, and certainly within the known human capabilities, we infer that the convergence of markets to rational expectations equilibria emerge mainly from the properties of the market and simple and plausible decision heuristics, rather than from complex and sophisticated optimization (Gary Becker, 1962 , Gerd Gigerenzer and P Todd, 1999 , V. L. Smith, 2008 .
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Instead of assuming sophisticated information processing capabilities and maximization objectives of agents, we can think of market structure constraining human behavior to guide their aggregate level outcomes to the neighborhood of theoretical equilibria. Becker (1962) showed that the downward slope of demand functions arise from individuals having to act within their budget constraints, even if they choose randomly from their opportunity sets. Smith (1962) Sunder (1996) extended the results to markets with shared uncertainty with algorithmic agents using means-end heuristic (henceforth M-E,) developed by Newell and Simon (1972) .
Substitution of human subjects used in traditional laboratory markets by algorithmic agents using M-E heuristic has the advantage of helping us gain precise control of traders' information processing and decision making (i.e., "cognitive") abilities. Holding trader "cognition" constant at a specified level allows us to explore the properties of outcomes of market structures and environment (also, see Angerer et al. (2010); and Huber et al. (2010) ). In contrast, we can neither observe nor hold invariant the strategies used by human traders.
The use of algorithmic traders enables us to run longer computational experiments, randomize parameters in the experimental setting, and conduct replications without significantly more time or money.
The paper is organized in four sections. The second section describes a simple M-E heuristic used by minimally-intelligent algorithmic traders in a double auction market. In the third section, we implement this heuristic in a market where some traders have perfect insider information (while others have no information) and compare the simulation results with the data from the profitmotivated human experiments reported by PS. The fourth section presents implications of the findings and some concluding remarks.
III. MEANS-END HEURISTIC
Simon ( Simon, 1956 ). The M-E heuristic for a trader thus requires a mechanism for setting an initial aspiration level, and a method for adjusting these levels in light of experience (e.g., Jamal and Sunder (1996)).
A. Market Environment
Markets examined here are defined by four elements: (i) uncertainty, (ii) distribution of information, (iii) security payoffs, and (iv) rules of the market. follows: after a bid or ask is generated (see section 2.3 for details on algorithm for generating bids and asks), the highest bid price is compared to the lowest ask price. If the bid price is equal to or greater than the ask price a trade occurs. The recorded transaction price is set to be equal to the midpoint between the bid and ask prices.
B. Implementing the M-E Heuristic
In the first of the two implementation steps, each agent's initial knowledge state (aspiration level) is set equal to the expected value of the payoff based on its private information. The second step implements the idea that subjects without perfect information make gradual adjustments by applying weight γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) to newest observed price P t , and weight (1-γ ) to their Current Aspiration Level (CAL t ). This process can be represented as a first-order adaptive process:
If CAL 0 is the initial value of CAL t , by substitution,
In the context of markets organized as double auctions (where both buyers and sellers can actively propose prices to transact at), these two elements of the M-E heuristic-setting an initial aspiration level and gradually adapting it in light of observed transaction prices 2 .
Minimally Intelligent Algorithmic Agents
Algorithmic agents use their "current aspiration level" (CAL) to implement a ZI strategy after Gode and Sunder (1993) ; they bid randomly chosen prices below and ask randomly chosen prices above their aspiration levels.
Traders draw a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and an upper limit of 1. If the number drawn is less than or equal to 0.5, the trader generates a bid; if the number drawn is greater than 0.5, it generates an ask. is determined by drawing a second random number between a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound of the individual trader's CAL. If this bid exceeds the current high bid, it becomes the new high bid. Correspondingly, if the action is an ask, its amount is determined by generating a second random number in the range between the lower bound of the traders CAL and the upper bound of 1. This newly generated ask becomes the new current low ask if it is less than the existing current low ask. These random draws from uniform distributions are generated independently. The algorithmic agents are myopic, making no attempt to anticipate, backward induct, or theorize about the behavior of other traders. They simply use the knowledge of observable past market events (transaction prices) to estimate their opportunity sets, and choose randomly from these sets.
These markets are populated in equal numbers by traders of each payoff type of whom 50% are (and 50% are not) informed about the realized state of world. The informed algorithmic traders begin by setting their initial CAL using the perfect signal they have about the realized state of the world for any given trader type j:
The uninformed traders of type j use their unconditional expected dividend value to set their initial CAL using the prior state probabilities: 
C. Experimental Design
We use the market design parameters from the PS (1982) human experiments for the present simulations (see Table 1 ). We ran 50 replications of four markets numbered 2, 3, 4 and 5 as reported by PS's (1982) human presumably, make this adjustment but our algorithmic traders do not. We should not, therefore, expect the markets with these minimally-intelligent agents to behave identically to the human markets. 6 At this stage, it would have been possible for the agents to keep track of the prices associated with each realized state and use this information in subsequent periods. In the spirit of minimal intelligence, our agents do not do so, and uninformed agents simply carry forward their CAL from the end of one period to the beginning of the next period. The CAL of informed agents responds to a perfect signal about the state realized in each period and is not dependent on experience in previous periods.
experiments (three states in Market 5, and two in the other three markets). six of these twelve traders had perfect inside information and the other six were uninformed. For consistency and ease of reference, we identify these markets using the same numbers as used by PS.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here. Figure 1 shows the time chart of prices observed in five asymmetric information periods of a market populated with profit-motivated human traders (heavy blue curve) reported in PS against the background of two theoretical (REsolid green horizontal line) and Walrasian (PI -dashed brown horizontal line)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INSIDER INFORMATION
7 Plott and Sunder (1982) found that the information structure of their Market 1 was too complex for it to reach rational expectations equilibrium in less than a dozen periods. Accordingly, we have not tried to replicate that information structure and market in these simulations. 8 In this paper we only report periods where six traders in the market are informed and the other six are uninformed. We have also simulated periods where all traders were informed, or all were uninformed. The results are not qualitatively different from human participants reported in PS. Full simulation results, including all periods with informed/uninformed traders are available at http://www.zitraders.com. This website also gives an outline of the code, and allows visitors to see the charts of market behavior. Table 2 for Market 2, in State X (low RE price) periods, average trading volume for human traders across the two periods is 19.5 while the average volume for algorithmic traders is 17.5. The allocative efficiency of human trader markets across the two X periods is 63.5%, while efficiency of the simulated markets is 80.3%. Note that allocative efficiency arises from having the appropriate number of securities being acquired by the appropriate type of traders as specified by rational expectations equilibrium. Efficiency levels (below 100%) arise when the wrong type of traders are holding some of the securities. In State Y (high RE price) periods, human traders' average volume is 19.3 (vs. 23.7 for algorithmic traders) and human trader efficiency is 100%, while algorithmic traders achieve efficiency levels of 98.7%. The direction and volume of trading is close to the predictions of RE equilibrium.
There are also important differences between the convergence paths for human and simulated markets: convergence of prices to RE predictions with human traders is tighter and progressively faster in later periods; algorithmic simulations exhibit little change from early to later realizations of the same state (X or Y). Efficiency results also show human subjects improving over time (when State is X), whereas markets populated with algorithmic traders show less improvement over time. Figure 1 and Table 2 about Here
Replication of the additional 2-state markets (Markets 3 and 4) with different parameters (see Figures 2 and 3 and the two middle sections of Table 2) show essentially the same pattern of convergence except that in State Y (with low RE price) human traders have a tendency to converge quickly to the RE price, especially in later periods (not coming from above or below) whereas the paths with algorithmic traders depend on history in the previous period (because the CAL of the uninformed is carried forward from previous periods). If the previous period is State X (high RE price) the simulation converges from above; if the previous period is State Y (low RE price), the simulation converges from below the RE price. As expected, algorithmic traders adjust slowly and learn myopically without any global awareness of equilibrium prices. Table 2 .
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 2 and 3 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 4 - allocative efficiency for human traders is 100% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 98.8% efficiency. In State Y (middle RE price) periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 96.8% (100% efficiency in all periods except the first realization of State Y) whereas algorithmic traders achieve 95.4% efficiency and do not achieve 100% efficiency in any individual period. In State X (low RE price) periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 87.7% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 91.5% efficiency. Table 2 shows volume and efficiency numerically. Again, it is clear that, outcomes of markets with profit-motivated human and minimally intelligent algorithmic traders exhibit the same central tendencies of convergence towards the predictions of rational expectations models. Apparently, the structural constraints of the market rules, and Newell and Simon's (1972) simple means-end heuristics are sufficient to yield this result even as the number of states in the market increases from 2 states to 3.
B. PRICE CHANGES, VOLUME AND EFFICIENCY
To assess price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium, we report results of a procedure used by Gode and Sunder (1993) who regressed the root mean squared deviation between transaction and RE equilibrium prices on the natural logarithm of the transaction sequence number within a period. If prices move towards RE levels over time, the slope coefficient of this regression should be less than zero. Four panels of Figure 5 show the behavior of this root mean square deviation over time for the four human and simulated market pairs. Results of ordinary least squares regressions of MSD on log of transaction sequence number in human and simulated markets are shown in two triplets in each panel (slope, p-value, and R 2 ) respectively. Three of the four human (with the exception of Market II), as well as all four simulated markets exhibit significant convergence to RE equilibrium, and the zero-slope hypothesis is rejected in favor of negative slope alternative at p < 0.000 for the seven of the eight (human and simulated) markets. About 80% of the reduction in the deviation from RE equilibria being explained by log of transaction sequence number. Figure 5 shows that root mean squared deviation of transaction from RE equilibrium prices tends towards 0.
Across all 32 periods of the four markets, the difference between the trading volume and efficiency ( and the average efficiency of simulated markets is 1.6% lower than that of markets with human traders (t-statistic of -1.08). There is no significant difference between the volumes and efficiency of markets with human traders as opposed to algorithmic traders. The inference is not that these simple algorithms capture all or even most of the behavior of the humans; that is not true. However, when seen through the perspective of aggregate market outcomes-prices, allocations, trading volume, and efficiency-in their central tendency, these simple heuristics appear to be sufficient to explain the human subject convergence to RE equilibria in these markets.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented evidence that individual behavior, modeled by simple means-end heuristics and minimal-intelligence, yields market-level outcomes Kahneman, 1974), we find that individuals using a simple means-end heuristic (analogous to Tversky and Kahneman's 1974 anchor-and-adjust heuristic) in a market setting generate outcomes close to the rational expectations equilibrium.
We interpret the results to suggest that, even in these relatively more complex market environments (as compared to Gode and Sunder (1993 , 1997 ) and Jamal and Sunder (1996 ), allocative efficiency of markets remains largely a function of their structure, not intelligence or optimizing behavior of agents. Attention to understanding the role of market structure, not just human cognition, may help advance our understanding of links between economic theory and market outcomes. Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 1 shows the parameters used in the experiment and the predictions about price and which trader type should hold securities in these markets. Our simulation uses the same parameters as those used in the PS experiment. Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 2 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels attained by human traders, as well as simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to update aspiration levels. The number of transactions and efficiency of markets with simulated and human traders are qualitatively comparable across state realizations in the four markets. Caption: Figure 1 shows the price paths in Market 2 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the "cloud" is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).
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Figure 2
Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 3 of Plott & Sunder (1982) Caption: Figure 2 shows the price paths in Market 3 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the "cloud" is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).
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Figure 3
Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 4 of Plott & Sunder (1982) Caption: Figure 3 shows the price paths in Market 4 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the "cloud" is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).
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Figure 4
Time Chart of Prices in a 3 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 5 of Plott & Sunder (1982) Caption: Figure 4 shows the price paths in Market 5 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the "cloud" is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under States Y and Z).
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Figure 5
Mean Squared Deviation of Observed Prices from RE Equilibrium Prices Caption: Figure 5 charts the progression of mean squared deviation of observed prices from RE equilibrium prices with respect to transaction sequence numbers (heavy blue line for price in markets with human traders; medium red line for algorithmic traders). In human Market 4, the first five root mean squared deviations exceed 0.02 (for a maximum of 0.145 for transaction 3), and are out-of-scale chosen for the y-axis. Ordinary Least Squares regression (MSD = α + β log Transaction No.) estimates of β, p-value and R 2 for human and algorithmic markets are shown numerically in boxes inside each chart (e.g., in market 5: β = -0.00082, p-value = 0.000 and R 2 = 0.90 for human markets).
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Figure 6
Average Number of Transactions for Algorithm Traders Versus Human Traders of Plott & Sunder (1982) 28 Figure 7 Average Efficiency of Algorithm Traders Versus Human Traders of Plott & Sunder (1982) 
